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I’M SORRY YOUR HONOR, YOU WILL NOT DECIDE MY FATE 
TODAY: THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN THE IMPOSITION OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY: A NOTE ON RING v. ARIZONA 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees 
every criminal defendant the right to a trial by jury.1  Since this is one of the 
most important rights that all American criminal defendants enjoy, the 
extension of the Sixth Amendment’s right to a trial by jury beyond core court 
proceedings has been an oft-litigated issue.  In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court 
deemed the Sixth Amendment inapplicable to Arizona’s death penalty 
sentencing statute because the aggravating circumstances found by the judge 
were not elements of the crime, and therefore these factors did not have to be 
decided by a jury.2 
Twelve years later, it seemed certain that Timothy Stuart Ring’s petition 
for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court would be denied because it was 
based on the exact point of law the Court in Walton had refused to recognize.  
However, recent decisions of the Supreme Court had begun to call into 
question the Walton decision without expressly overruling precedent.3  The 
Supreme Court decided to take Case Number 01-488, because of the 
unintelligible and convoluted rule it had judicially created with its own 
precedent4 Timothy Stuart Ring v. Arizona.5  In taking this case, the Court 
seemingly made a commitment to cure this ambiguity and its their rule.  After 
this case, many issues are seemingly still open.  The following questions must 
then be asked: Is this rule any better than the previous rule?; What parties may 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating, in relevant part, that: “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed”). 
 2. Walton v. Ariz., 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990). 
 3. Id. (holding this same Arizona sentencing statute constitutional under the Sixth 
Amendment); Apprendi v. N.J., 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000) (holding unconstitutional New Jersey’s 
sentencing guidelines which allowed for a larger sentence to be imposed by the judge than was 
imposed by the jury); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 229, 252 (1999) (suggesting that any fact, 
other than prior conviction, that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be submitted to 
a jury). 
 4. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 538 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The distinction of Walton offered 
by the [Apprendi] Court today is baffling, to say the least.”). 
 5. Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002). 
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partake in what roles in sentencing?; What formula of judge and jury fact-
finding is constitutional and what sort of system will be unconstitutional after 
this decision? 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR TO RING 
A. Walton v. Arizona 
In the Supreme Court’s first attempt to decide whether or not the 
sentencing scheme of Arizona comported with the Sixth Amendment’s trial by 
jury clause, the Court decided Walton v. Arizona.  In March 1986, Jeffrey 
Walton and two co-defendants went to a bar in Tucson, Arizona, intending to 
rob a bar patron, steal his car and leave him tied up while they fled the state in 
the victim’s car.6  Walton and his two co-defendants encountered Thomas 
Powell in the parking lot of this bar and robbed him as planned.  After driving 
Powell to the desert and having a conversation with his 2 cohorts, Walton 
instructed his co-defendants to wait in the car while he marched Powell off into 
the desert.  Walton then shot Powell once in the head with a .22 caliber 
Derringer.  Walton was tried by a jury and sentenced in front of the trial judge 
alone.  The sentencing was carried out pursuant to Arizona revised statute 13-
703, the very same way in which the defendant in the later Ring case, Timothy 
Ring, was sentenced.7  The trial judge, after finding facts and weighing all of 
the aggravating and mitigating factors, sentenced Walton to death.8 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice White and joined by 
four other justices,9 found that the aggravating circumstances laid out by the 
trial court in this case were not elements of the crime, and thus there was no 
need for the jury to find the facts associated with them.  The Supreme Court 
distinguished between aggravating factors and elements of the crime and 
found the factors in this case to be aggravating factors and not elements of the 
crime.10  The Supreme Court thus affirmed the judgment of the trial court and 
 
 6. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 644-45 (all facts in this paragraph are taken from the Supreme 
Court’s recitation of the facts). 
 7. Id. at 645 (finding the same two aggravating factors found by the trial court in Ring of 
pecuniary gain and heinousness). 
 8. Id. Arizona law required that the sentencing hearing be conducted in front of the judge 
alone. 
 9. Id. at 639 (Justice White’s opinion was signed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
O’Connor, Scalia and Kennedy). 
 10. Id. at 649 (“we cannot conclude that a State is required to denominate aggravating 
circumstances ‘elements’ of the offense or permit only a jury to determine the existence of such 
circumstances.”). 
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the Arizona Supreme Court11 and found the Sixth Amendment inapplicable to 
the Arizona death penalty sentencing scheme under section 13-703. 
If Walton was the only case in the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the 
applicability of the Sixth Amendment to sentencing schemes such as section 
13-703, then would have been decided purely on stare decisis grounds.  A 
petition for a writ of certiorari probably would never have been granted.  
However, more recent cases began to question the Court’s jurisprudence on 
this issue, while specifically not overruling Walton.12 
B. Jones v. United States 
In the Supreme Court’s next attempt to resolve exactly what type of 
sentencing scheme would and would not violate the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee of a trial by jury, the Court decided Jones v. United States.13  
Nathaniel Jones and two others held up two men, resulting in Jones forcing one 
of the men back into the car after robbing both men and driving off in the car.14  
Jones then let the victim out of the car and was pursued by the police until he 
crashed the vehicle into a telephone pole. 
Jones was charged with one count of violating the federal carjacking 
statute15 and was told by the magistrate judge that he would be sentenced to no 
more than fifteen years in jail.  The judge submitted instructions to the jury, 
which defined the elements solely as in paragraph one of section 2219,16 and 
the jury returned a verdict of guilty.  The pre-sentence investigation report, 
which was submitted to the trial court before the imposition of sentence, 
suggested that Jones should be sentenced to twenty-five years because one of 
the victims subsequently suffered serious ear damage from the assault 
 
 11. State v. Walton, 769 P.2d 1017, 1032 (Ariz. 1989) aff’d, Walton, 497 U.S. at 656. 
 12. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496 (differentiating the Arizona sentencing scheme in Walton 
from the New Jersey sentencing scheme in that case); see also Jones, 526 U.S. at 251 (also 
differentiating Walton). 
 13. Jones, 526 U.S. at 227. 
 14. Id. at 229-30 (all facts in this paragraph are taken from the Supreme Court’s recitation of 
the facts). 
 15. The 1994 version of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 then stated that: 
Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title takes a motor vehicle 
that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the 
person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do 
so, shall (1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, (2) if 
serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title) results, be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both. 
 16. The elements of the crime submitted to the jury did not include the aggravating factors 
later determined at sentencing. 
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preceding the carjacking.17  The magistrate judge then sentenced Jones to 
twenty-five years for the carjacking count. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether the 
Sixth Amendment is violated if a judge sentences a defendant to a term greater 
than the jury can sentence the defendant on its factual findings.18  The Supreme 
Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter, held that the three paragraphs of section 
2119 must be held as separate offenses, with separate elements, that must be 
found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt and not by the judge.19 
The Court in Jones sidestepped the issue of the applicability of Walton by 
simply distinguishing the two statutes and saying that “[w]e are frank to say 
that we emphasize this careful reading of Walton’s rationale because the 
question implicated by the Government’s position on the meaning of section 
2119(2) is too significant to be decided without being squarely faced.”20  In 
fact, the dissent believed that there was absolutely no need to address the 
Walton case or to cast doubt on it as it believed that the majority had done.21  
In looking at the rule that the majority laid down in this case, the dissent 
seemed to foreshadow the exact question and result in Ring, saying: 
If it is constitutionally impermissible to allow a judge’s finding to increase the 
maximum punishment for carjacking by 10 years, it is not clear why a judge’s 
finding may increase the maximum punishment for murder from imprisonment 
to death. In fact, Walton would appear to have been a better candidate for the 
Court’s new approach than is the instant case. In Walton, the question was the 
aggravated character of the defendant’s conduct, not, as here, a result that 
followed after the criminal conduct had been completed. In distinguishing this 
line of precedent, the Court suggests Walton did not “squarely fac[e]” the key 
constitutional question “implicated by the Government’s position on the 
meaning of § 2119(2).”  The implication is clear.  Reexamination of this area 
of our capital jurisprudence can be expected.22 
C. Apprendi v. New Jersey 
The final case in this line of jurisprudence prior to Ring was Apprendi v. 
New Jersey.  In an opinion written by Justice Stevens for five justices, the 
 
 17. The injury to the victim which was sustained during the carjacking did not become 
serious until after the initial crime, but was a direct result of the assault. 
 18. Id. at 232. 
 19. Jones, 526 U.S. at 252 (in effect the aggravating factors should be treated as the 
functional equivalent of elements of the crime). 
 20. Id. at 251. 
 21. Id. at 271-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) Justice Kennedy was confused as to why 
aggravating factors were viewed in one way in Walton and in another way here.  If the Court was 
correct in Walton, why should the result be different here? 
 22. Id. at 272 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
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Supreme Court held unconstitutional a New Jersey sentencing scheme which 
allowed a judge to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a charged 
crime was a hate crime.23  This finding then allowed a judge to increase the 
maximum sentence imposed for a second degree offense from between five 
and ten years to between ten and twenty years.24 
The Petitioner, Charles Apprendi, fired several .22 caliber bullets into the 
home of an African-American family that had recently moved into a previously 
all-white neighborhood in New Jersey.25  After being arrested, Apprendi made 
a statement that he did not know the family personally, but that because the 
family was black, he did not want them to live in the neighborhood.26  
Apprendi was indicted, and later plead guilty to the two counts on the 
indictment, for second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose.  
The State reserved the right to ask for a sentencing enhancement on the count 
related to the facts described above so long as Apprendi could reserve the right 
to challenge the constitutionality of the sentencing enhancement scheme.  If 
the judge was to find that the crime on December 22nd was not a hate crime, 
the maximum sentence for this crime would have been between ten and twenty 
years total for the two counts.  If, however, the judge was to find the hate crime 
sentencing enhancement to be present, the maximum sentence for one of the 
counts could be twenty years, for a total of thirty years possible incarceration 
between the two counts.27 
The judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the crime was a 
“hate crime” within the meaning of the sentencing enhancement guidelines and 
sentenced Apprendi to twelve years for this one count, two years greater than 
he could have been sentenced if he was found guilty by a jury without the 
sentencing enhancement.  This sentence was, however, well within the range 
allowed by the sentencing enhancement guidelines of New Jersey’s hate crime 
statute.28  This statute allowed for a sentence of between ten and twenty years 
on each count.29  In an unsuccessful appeal,30 the New Jersey Supreme Court 
 
 23.  
 24. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69. 
 25. Id. at 469 (all facts in this paragraph are taken from the Supreme Court’s recitation of the 
facts). 
 26. This statement was later recanted by Apprendi. 
 27. 5-10 years for each count if this is not a hate crime for 10-20 years total.  If count one 
was found to be a hate crime, that count would carry a 10-20 year sentence, or a total of 15-30 
years for the two counts. 
 28. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999) provided that: (e) The defendant in 
committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals 
because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity (repealed 2001). 
 29. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471. 
 30. State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 497. 
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found the Supreme Court decision in Jones inapplicable and affirmed the 
decision.31 
After granting a petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of whether a judge alone, by a preponderance of the evidence, could 
impose a sentence longer than could have possibly been imposed if the jury 
had found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Court 
suggested that there is a distinction between an element of a crime and a 
sentencing factor because the Constitution requires the former be found 
beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury, and allows the judge to find the latter 
by the same or a lesser standard.32  The Court further found that “other than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”33  In attempting to distinguish the sentencing 
scheme in Walton, the Court specifically stated that the sentencing scheme in 
this case was different from that in Walton: “[f]inally, this Court has previously 
considered and rejected the argument that the principles guiding our decision 
today render invalid state capital sentencing schemes requiring judges, after a 
jury verdict holding a defendant guilty of a capital crime, to find specific 
aggravating factors before imposing a sentence of death.”34 
The dissent took issue with the distinction offered by the majority and 
suggested that it was “baffling.”35  The dissent further suggested the 
jurisprudence of the Court, and the Walton case specifically, dictated that 
Apprendi’s sentence should be affirmed.36 
III.  THE RING CASE IN STATE COURT 
A. Facts leading to the Sentencing of Timothy Stuart Ring 
On November 28, 1994, a Wells Fargo armored van arrived at the 
Arrowhead Mall in Glendale, Arizona.37  The Wells Fargo courier went into 
the Dillard’s department store to pick up a money drop, only to return to the 
 
 31. Id. at 493 (“[b]ecause the language in Jones was not essential to its holding, and because 
the Court did not expressly overrule the Almendarez-Torres formulation, we believe that case still 
states the rationale that we must apply here”). 
 32. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478. 
 33. Id. at 490. 
 34. Id. at 496. 
 35. Id. at 538 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[t]he distinction of Walton offered by the 
[Apprendi] Court today is baffling, to say the least”). 
 36. Id. at 554 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  It should be noted that Justice O’Connor wrote the 
majority opinion in the Walton case and also signed the dissent in Jones. 
 37. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2432-33.  All of the facts in this paragraph are taken from the Supreme 
Court’s recitation of the facts. 
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parking lot to find the van and driver missing.  The truck was located later that 
day, with the doors locked and the engine running.  The driver was found dead 
from a single shot to the head.  Over $730,000 in cash and checks were 
missing from the van.  The police conducted a thorough investigation and 
eventually arrested Timothy Ring, after executing a search warrant on his 
house and finding in excess of $271,000 in cash. 
At the trial of Timothy Ring, the State proffered voluminous evidence of 
the crime and conspiracy.38  The judge submitted instructions to the jury on the 
alternative charges of premeditated murder and felony murder.39  The jury was 
unable to return a verdict on the premeditated murder charge,40 but they were 
able to unanimously convict on the lesser instructed charge of felony murder.41  
Ring was found guilty of felony murder committed in the commission of an 
armed robbery.  The verdict of felony murder returned by the jury is what 
precipitated the controversy in this case, since only when aggravating factors 
are found can the death penalty be imposed upon those guilty of felony 
murder. 
B. The Sentencing Phase of Timothy Ring’s Trial 
Ring was convicted of first-degree murder pursuant to Arizona rev. stat. 
section 13-1105(A)(2), which allows for a first-degree conviction not only in 
cases of premeditated murder, but also in cases where the accused: 
Acting either alone or with one or more other persons the person commits or 
attempts to commit . . . robbery under § 13-1902, 13-1903 or 13-1904 . . . and 
in the course of and in furtherance of the offense or immediate flight from the 
offense, the person or another person causes the death of any person.42 
The pre-Ring version of Arizona’s sentencing statute, 13-703(A), provided in 
pertinent part that: 
When a defendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty to first degree murder as 
defined in § 13-1105, the judge who presided at the trial . . . shall conduct a 
separate sentencing hearing to determine the existence or nonexistence of the 
circumstances included in subsections G and H of this section, for the purpose 
of determining the sentence to be imposed. The hearing shall be conducted 
 
 38. The State of Arizona offered evidence of the money found at Ring’s house and taped 
phone conversations between Ring and his accomplices in which they commented about the 
ineptitude of the police investigation. 
 39. Id. at 2433. 
 40. Id.  Six of the jurors voted to acquit Ring of the charge of premeditated murder. 
 41. Id. 
 42. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1105(A)(2) (2001). 
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before the court alone. The court alone shall make all factual determinations 
required by this section or the Constitution of the United States or this state.43 
Under the common law, the judge was required first to find whether Timothy 
Ring was the actual killer of the victim44 or at least a “major participant” in the 
felony committed.45  The judge must then determine that the defendant 
demonstrated “reckless indifference to human life” in order to allow a sentence 
of death for felony murder.46  During the sentencing phases a convicted co-
conspirator implicated Ring as the leader of the group and stated that he 
witnessed Ring take the shot at the driver of the armored van.47  This was in 
spite of the fact that this same witness, James Greenham,48 testified that he had 
previously stated that Ring had nothing to do with the planning and was only 
testifying to “pay back” Ring for threats made by Ring to interfere with the 
relationship between Greenham and his ex-wife.49  The judge then found that 
Ring was eligible for death under Enmund and Tison. 
Under subsection G of section 13-703, the judge was next required to find 
the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.50 The 
trial judge found that two aggravating circumstances under subsection G were 
present in this case.  Both the fact that “the defendant committed the offense as 
consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of 
pecuniary value” 51 and “the defendant committed the offense in an especially 
heinous, cruel or depraved manner.”52  The judge also found the existence of 
one mitigating circumstance, under subsection H of 13-703,53 in that the 
 
 43. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(C) (2001) (emphasis added). 
 44. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (requiring that in order for a charge of 
felony murder to carry the death penalty, the accused must be the actual killer). 
 45.  
 46. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 n.12 (qualifying Enmund) (stating: 
[a]lthough we state these two requirements separately, they often overlap.  For example, 
we do not doubt that there are some felonies as to which one could properly conclude that 
any major participant necessarily exhibits reckless indifference to the value of human life.  
Moreover, even in cases where the fact that the defendant was a major participant in a 
felony did not suffice to establish reckless indifference, that fact would still often provide 
significant support for such a finding.). 
 47. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2435. 
 48. State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1144 (Ariz. 2001), rev’d, 122 S.Ct. at 2443 (stating 
Greenham’s alleged nickname is “Yoda”). 
 49. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2435. 
 50. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(G) (2001). 
 51. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(G)(5) (2001).  The judge concluded that this factor was 
present because of the over $700,000 stolen and the $271,000 found at Ring’s house. 
 52. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(G)(6) (2001).  The judge concluded that this factor was 
present solely because of the testimony of Ring’s co-conspirator, James Greenham. 
 53. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(H) (2001) (“The trier of fact shall consider as mitigating 
circumstances any factors proffered by the defendant or the state that are relevant in determining 
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defendant had a minimal criminal record, which is not specifically enumerated 
in subsection G, but allowable under the section. 
After making these findings of fact, the trial judge sentenced Timothy 
Stuart Ring to death under section 13-703.  Timothy Ring was incarcerated 
pending the outcome of his appeals. 
C. The Arizona Supreme Court 
After Timothy Ring was convicted, he appealed directly to the Arizona 
Supreme Court, asserting as one ground for reversible error that the trial court 
failed to follow the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jones and Apprendi in 
considering whether Arizona’s sentencing scheme was indeed constitutional.54  
The State, in response, pointed to the fact that the Walton case had specifically 
addressed Arizona’s sentencing statute and Jones and Apprendi had 
specifically distinguished Walton.55 
The Arizona Supreme Court engaged in a full Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
analysis regarding Ring’s claims.  The court seemed to be confused as how to 
reconcile Walton with the Supreme Court’s subsequent jurisprudence in Jones 
and Apprendi.56  The Arizona court felt that the instant case was exactly what 
Justice O’Connor feared in her dissenting opinion in Apprendi.  They stated 
that “the present case is precisely as described in Justice O’Connor’s dissent – 
Defendant’s death sentence required the judge’s factual findings.”57  Although 
the Arizona Supreme Court found the arguments of Timothy Ring persuasive, 
they were “bound by the Supremacy Clause in such matters.”58  Therefore the 
Arizona Supreme Court found they “must conclude that Walton [wa]s still the 
controlling authority and that the Arizona death penalty scheme ha[d] not been 
held unconstitutional under either Apprendi or Jones.”59  The Arizona court 
thus, albeit reluctantly, accepted the arguments of the State regarding the 
applicability of Walton after Apprendi and Jones. 
 
whether to impose a sentence less than death, including any aspect of the defendant’s character, 
propensities or record and any of the circumstances of the offense.”). 
 54. State v. Ring, 25 P.3d at 1150. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1151-52. 
 57. Id at 1151.  Justice O’Connor opined: 
a defendant convicted of first-degree murder in Arizona cannot receive a death sentence 
unless a judge makes the factual determination that a statutory aggravating factor exists. 
Without that critical finding, the maximum sentence to which the defendant is exposed is 
life imprisonment, and not the death penalty . . . If the Court does not intend to overrule 
Walton, one would be hard pressed to tell from the opinion it issues today.) (citing 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 538 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 58. Id. at 1152. 
 59. State v. Ring, 35 P.3d at 1152. 
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The Arizona Supreme Court then turned to the other issues allowing for 
the death sentence.  The court found that if the evidence of Ring’s actual 
commission of the homicide or major participation in the crime was limited to 
the evidence admitted at trial, then there would not have been sufficient 
evidence for the finding of a death sentence under the Enmund-Tison 
standard.60  However, because the court found that the judge may take into 
account evidence offered at sentencing,61 the trial judge was proper in his 
Enmund-Tison determination. 
Next, turning to the aggravating factors, the Arizona Supreme Court found 
that there was not evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, to support the trial 
court’s determination of depravity or heinousness under section 13-
703(G)(6).62  The court did, however, find that there was evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did have pecuniary gains from this crime 
and allowed this aggravating factor under section 13-703(G)(5).63  The court 
finally suggested that the one mitigating factor found by the trial court, the lack 
of criminal history, was valid, but was entitled to little weight.64 
After reviewing all of the evidence, the court found that the lack of the 
heinousness itself was not reversible error.  The court concluded that it had 
previously, and would in this case, support pecuniary gain as the sole 
aggravating factor to allow a death penalty conviction for felony murder.65  
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death penalty 
sentence of Timothy Ring.66 
The concurrence argued that the reliance by the majority on mere 
Supremacy Clause arguments for its decision, and that its fear that this case 
may not be correctly decided, was misplaced.67  The concurrence argued that 
this case was clearly correct since the maximum statutory penalty for first 
degree murder is death, and without a finding by a jury of first-degree murder, 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. (discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(E)).  This evidence could include the 
testimony of co-conspirator James Greenham. 
 62. Id. at 1154 (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(G)(6) is now ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(F)(6) 
after the 2002 legislative amendments). 
 63. Id.  (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(G)(5) is now ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(F)(5) after the 
2002 legislative amendments). 
 64. State v. Ring, 35 P.3d at 1155. 
 65. Id. at 1156 (“After our independent review, we conclude that even crediting Defendant’s 
minimal criminal record, the mitigating evidence is not sufficient to call for leniency in light of 
the facts of this case. This murder was not the result of sudden impulse or loss of control nor a 
robbery gone bad, but a planned, ruthless robbery and killing.”). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1157 (Martone, J., concurring).  Since the Apprendi case specifically distinguished 
Walton, the issue of Apprendi calling Walton into doubt is moot. 
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the death penalty could not be imposed.  Finally, the concurrence suggested 
that it should matter not who sentences the convicted defendant.68 
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN RING V. ARIZONA 
A. Making it to the Supreme Court 
After losing his appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court, Timothy Ring then 
petitioned for a writ of certiorari, to the U.S. Supreme Court which was 
granted.69  The Court accepted the Petitioner’s Brief,70 the Respondent’s 
brief,71 a Reply Brief from the Petitioner,72 as well as Amicus Curiae Briefs 
from the Attorneys General of multiple states,73 the Criminal Justice Law 
Center74 and the National Crime Victims Law Institute.75  The case was argued 
on April 22, 2002. 
The Court decided the matter, with six members76 voting to reverse the 
Arizona Supreme Court decision and invalidate Walton in favor of Apprendi 
and Jones.  Justice Scalia delivered a concurring opinion, joined by Justice 
Thomas.  Justice Kennedy also filed a concurring opinion.  Justice Breyer filed 
an opinion concurring only in the judgment.  Justice O’Connor filed a 
dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist.  Each of these opinions 
will be handled separately below. 
B. The Majority Opinion 
After a recitation of the facts and procedural history which brought this 
case to the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, 
 
 68. Id. at 1158 (Martone, J., concurring). 
 69. State v. Ring, 35 P.3d 1139, cert. granted, 122 S.Ct. 865 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2002) (No. 01-
488). 
 70. Brief for Petitioner, Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002) (No. 01-488) (2002 WL 
432399). 
 71. Brief for Respondent, Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002) (No. 01-488) (2002 WL 
481144). 
 72. Reply Brief for Petitioner, Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002) (No. 01-488) (2002 
WL 649366). 
 73. Amicus Curiae Brief for Respondent, Filed by Attorneys General of Ala., Colo., Del., 
Fla., Idaho, Ind., Miss., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.Y., Pa., S.C., Utah, Va., Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 
2428 (2002) (No. 01-488) (2002 WL 481140). 
 74. Amicus Curiae Brief for Respondent, Filed by Ariz. Voice for Crime Victims and Nat’l 
Crime Victim Law Inst., Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002) (No. 01-488) (2002 WL 
730737). 
 75. Amicus Curiae Brief for Respondent, Filed by Criminal Justice Legal Found., Ring v. 
Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002) (No. 01-488) (2002 WL 730734). 
 76. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2432 (Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the court in which 
Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas joined). 
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immediately recognized that the statute called into question by Petitioner 
Timothy Ring had been squarely addressed before.77  The previous case78 had 
directly addressed the issue of the constitutionality of the Arizona death 
penalty sentencing scheme and found that scheme constitutional under the 
Sixth Amendment.79  The Court granted certiorari to decide the impact of its 
more recent cases which seemed to cast doubt on the Walton decision without 
explicitly overturning it.  For this reason, the Court was prompted into its most 
recent venture into this area of constitutional law. 
The Court recognized that based solely on the findings of the jury, the 
maximum sentence that Timothy Ring could have been given was life in 
prison, and only after the intervention of the judge alone could Ring be 
sentenced to death.80  The Court wanted to answer the question of whether this 
aggravating factor could be found by a judge or was required by the Sixth 
Amendment of the Constitution81 to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.82  One of the main questions raised by the Court in this case was the 
differentiation between elements of a crime and aggravating circumstances of 
a crime, and what procedural differences should exist between the two at the 
trial level.  The Court concluded that the differences should not be one of form, 
but rather of effect.83  In foreshadowing to Justice Scalia’s concurrence, the 
Court did not believe that the mere naming of a factual finding as one or the 
other should allow it to be found constitutionally by the judge and not the 
jury.84  The answer, the Court concluded, was that if a factual finding has the 
ability to increase the sentence to a level greater than it can be found without 
this finding, then that fact must be considered the functional equivalent of an 
element of the crime, and thus cannot be found solely by the judge, no matter 
what it may be called.85 
The Court rejected Arizona’s argument that since the Arizona statute86 
specifically allowed for the sentence of life or a sentence imposing the death 
penalty; that these are mere sentencing options to which the judge has 
 
 77. Id. at 2437. 
 78. Walton, 497 U.S. at 649. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2437.  In Arizona, a defendant cannot be sentenced to death without 
the finding of an aggravating factor, which can only be found by a judge. 
 81. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273-74 (1948) (making the Sixth Amendment applicable to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 82. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2437. 
 83. Id. at 2439-40. 
 84. Id. at 2439. 
 85. Id. at 2443. 
 86. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1105(C) (2001). 
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discretion to sentence within the range authorized by the jury verdict.87  The 
Court noted again, that in effect, the verdict of the jury cannot impose a 
sentence of death, but only a sentence of life imprisonment, unless a further 
factual finding is made by the judge.  Because this further finding by the judge 
increases the sentence above the maximum penalty that could be imposed by 
the jury, this scheme is unconstitutional.88  The Court also found unpersuasive 
the distinction between sentencing factors and elements proffered by 
Arizona.89  Finally, the Court rejected Arizona’s argument that decision on the 
death penalty are unique from the Court’s other jurisprudence on the Sixth 
Amendment and therefore the Court should allow the aggravating factors for 
the death penalty to be found by the judge alone.90  The Court found no reason 
to except capital defendants from the Sixth Amendment guarantees laid out in 
Jones and Apprendi91 and rejected this argument as well. 
The Court concluded by stating the importance of stare decisis,92 and 
suggested that a decision of the Supreme Court should never be overruled 
lightly, but can be overruled in cases where the “necessity and propriety of 
doing so has been established[;] . . . this is such a case.”93  The Court found 
that “Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable; our Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence cannot be home to both.”94  The Court then overruled Walton95 
“to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury to find an 
aggravating circumstance necessary for the imposition of the death penalty.”96  
The Court finally held that the “aggravating factors” in the Arizona scheme 
were nothing more than “the functional equivalent of an element of a greater 
offense”97 and “the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.”98  
In conclusion, Justice Ginsburg stated that it would make no sense to leave the 
 
 87. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2440.  Our country has a significant history of discretionary 
sentencing by judges, a fact not lost on the dissenting Justices. 
 88. Id. at 2440-41. 
 89. Id. at 2441 (in large part reciting the differentiation found by the majority in Walton 
based on the fact that the aggravating factors were called aggravating factors and not elements of 
the crime). 
 90. Id. (stating “[d]eath is different”). 
 91. Id. at 2442 (“Arizona presents ‘no specific reason for excepting capital defendants from 
the constitutional protections . . . extend[ed] to defendants generally, and none is readily 
apparent.’” (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 539 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)). 
 92. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2442-43 (although “the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental 
importance to the rule of law[,] . . . [o]ur precedents are not sacrosanct” (quoting Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989)). 
 93. Id. at 2443. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. (“accordingly, we overrule Walton”). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Ring, 122 S.Ct at 2443 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, n. 19). 
 98. Id. at 2443. 
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Court’s jurisprudence the way it was before this decision; to say that an 
increase in sentence by two years must be found by a jury, but that the finding 
of death over life could be found by a judge.  The Supreme Court thus reversed 
the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.99 
C. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, was torn by two conflicting 
interests in attempting to resolve this case.  On the one hand, Justice Scalia did 
not agree with fact the Constitution necessarily places procedural sentencing 
requirements on the states, and therefore did not understand how any 
sentencing, whether conducted by the judge or the jury, can rise to the level of 
a constitutional issue.100  On the other hand, Justice Scalia recognized that his 
decisions in previous cases, such as Apprendi, required him to find that “all 
facts essential to the imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant 
receives – whether the statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing 
factors, or Mary Jane – must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”101 
Justice Scalia further recognized a possible manipulation of the 
Constitution after Walton in that states could call certain factors relevant to 
sentencing an aggravating factor for the judge to decide, and make an end-run 
around the constitutional guarantee of a trial by jury.102  For these reasons, 
Justice Scalia decided to join the opinion of the Court.103 
D. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence 
While Justice Kennedy still believed that Apprendi was incorrectly 
decided, he stated that Apprendi is now the law and must be followed.  In 
applying the law of Apprendi to the facts of this case, Justice Kennedy 
concluded that “[i]t is beyond question that during the penalty phase of a first-
degree murder prosecution in Arizona, the finding of an aggravating 
circumstance exposes ‘the defendant to a greater punishment than that 
authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict.’”104  Based on this application of the 
facts of this case to the law of Apprendi, Justice Kennedy stated that he 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 2444 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 101. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 102. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2445. (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia is not making any 
particular accusations, but rather stating the possibility of abuse. 
 103. Id. at 2445. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 104. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494). 
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“agree[d] with the Court . . . that Apprendi and Walton cannot stand together as 
the law.”105 
E. Justice Breyer’s Concurrence in the Judgment 
Justice Breyer did not sign on to the majority opinion of the Court in this 
case, but nonetheless concurred in the judgment because he believed that death 
penalty sentencing by the jury is mandated by the Eighth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.106  Justice Breyer reached this conclusion because, 
in his opinion, without special procedural safeguards when the death penalty is 
involved, the punishment will be considered cruel and unusual.107  Because the 
focus of this case note is not the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 
Eighth Amendment, this opinion will not be addressed further.108 
F. The Dissent 
Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the 
majority opinion.  The dissenters agreed with the majority that there is no room 
for both Walton and Apprendi to stand in concert.109  The main difference 
between the dissent and the majority, however, is that the dissent would have 
overruled Apprendi, not Walton.110  Justice O’Connor believed that Apprendi 
was wrongly decided because the rule in Apprendi was “not required by the 
Constitution, by history, or by our prior cases . . . [a]nd it ignores the 
significant history in this country of . . . discretionary sentencing by judges.”111 
Justice O’Connor then discussed the effects of Apprendi on the U.S. legal 
system and her belief that the number of habeas corpus petitions has risen 
sharply, a phenomenon she attributed to the Apprendi decision.112  Since 
Justice O’Connor simply saw Ring as an extension of Apprendi, she believed 
that this phenomenon would just increase the number of claims of 
 
 105. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 106. Id. at 2446 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 107. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2446 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 108. Id. at 2445 (Scalia, J., concurring).  It is worth noting that Justice Scalia scalds Justice 
Breyer for this approach, saying, “today’s judgment has nothing to do with jury sentencing” and 
“there is really no way in which Justice Breyer can travel with the happy band that reaches 
today’s result unless he says yes to Apprendi.  Concisely put, Justice Breyer is on the wrong 
flight; he should either get off before the doors close, or buy a ticket to Apprendi-land. 
 109. Id. at 2448 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 110. Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting.  It is of note that Justice O’Connor authored the majority 
opinion in Walton and authored the dissent in Apprendi. 
 111. Id. at 2449 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 544 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting)). 
 112. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2449 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the belief of the Office of 
the United States Courts for the increase in habeas corpus petitions). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
536 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:521 
 
unconstitutionality of sentences based on Apprendi and Ring.113  Because the 
dissenters believed that the sentencing in this case was in accordance with the 
Sixth Amendment, they would have affirmed the conviction of Timothy 
Ring.114 
V.  RING AND BEYOND, THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RING HOLDING 
This section will deal with the implications of the Ring decision.  The 
focus will be not only on the applicability of this decision on statutes that are 
very similar to it, but also its more general applicability to other state death 
penalty statutes, which may now be called into doubt.  This section will also 
address sentencing schemes which seem to move elements of the crime, to be 
decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, to sentencing considerations 
which can be found by the judge by the same or a lesser standard.  These 
schemes may also face constitutional scrutiny in the near future. 
This section will accomplish this by first looking at the holding in Ring, as 
well as Apprendi and Jones, and determining exactly what these cases hold and 
what they require of lawmakers in order to guarantee compliance with the 
Sixth Amendment.  Second, the implications of the Ring decision will be 
discussed, both constitutionally and practically, how these cases will affect the 
cases already on the books, and how they will affect cases in the future.  Third, 
other state statutes which may be implicated by this decision will be addressed.  
Finally, the subsequent case law will be examined, to determine how the lower 
courts are indeed distinguishing or following Ring in evaluating their own state 
statutes. 
A. What are the Requirements Now? 
One of the principal issues raised is what exactly the Ring case requires 
after its adjudication.  Does this case say that juries alone must find facts 
which could lead to a greater period of sentencing, or does the decision say that 
judges alone must not find these facts?  The facts of the Ring case were of a 
sentencing scheme which allowed a judge, sitting without a jury, to find the 
facts relevant to the aggravating factors listed in the Arizona first-degree 
murder statute.115  So, the obvious holding is that judges alone must not find 
the relevant factors that may lead to a death-penalty sentence; but is the 
obvious extension of this that these facts must be found by juries alone?  The 
 
 113. Id. at 2449-50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The number of second or successive habeas 
corpus petitions filed in the federal courts also increased by 77% in 2001.”). 
 114. Id. at 2450 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 115. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (2001). 
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question is important because of the volume of statutes which employ some 
sort of hybrid system for determining these factors.116 
The exact holding of the case is this: 
We hold that Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable; our Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence cannot be home to both.  Accordingly, we overrule Walton to the 
extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an 
aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty.  
Because Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‘the functional 
equivalent of an element of a greater offense,’ the Sixth Amendment requires 
that they be found by a jury.117 
It seems plain that a scheme by which the judge may increase the 
maximum sentence of a convicted defendant outside of the presence of the jury 
is unconstitutional both in death-penalty cases,118 as well as any non-capital 
case.119  As stated above, one question that remains open is whether or not a 
system can survive Sixth Amendment scrutiny if it uses some combination of 
the judge and the jury to make the decision relevant to aggravating factors, or 
if a jury alone must decide those issues beyond a reasonable doubt.  The crux 
of the issue will most likely lie in the nature of the involvement of the two 
parties, the judge and the jury.  If the fact-finding is truly left to the jury, and 
the judge has little or no discretion once the jury renders its opinion, then this 
system should be acceptable.  These different variations will be addressed 
specifically below. 
B. Author’s Comments on the Ring decision 
In looking at the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence leading up to the Ring 
case, it seemed plain that the Court needed to directly answer the question of 
the applicability of Walton after Jones and Apprendi.  After the Court’s 
decisions in Jones and Apprendi, it was painfully obvious that the Court was 
simply attempting to distinguish its cases in an effort to preserve stare decisis.  
These distinctions became rather arbitrary; a point even noticed by some 
members of the Court themselves.120  Stare decisis is very important, but what 
became much more important and obvious to the Court was that its decisions, 
read in concert with each other, made absolutely no sense. 
 
 116. Hybrid and other varied sentencing schemes which may be implicated by the Ring 
decision will be more fully discussed herein. 
 117. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2443 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470; see also Jones, 526 U.S. at 252. 
 120. Id. at 538 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[t]he distinction of Walton offered by the 
[Apprendi] Court today is baffling, to say the least”). 
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The Court needed to take this case; not only if it wanted to reverse Walton, 
but also if it wanted to re-affirm Walton.  The Court needed to provide a better 
answer than was given after Jones and Apprendi.  In doing what the Court did, 
it did make its jurisprudence much more consistent, but was it the right choice? 
In deciding, through this line of cases, that any factor which may lead to 
the increase in sentence must not be found by a judge, sitting without a jury, 
the Court relied on the Sixth Amendment.121  Does the right to a trial by jury 
equate to a right to sentencing by a jury and factual determinations that a crime 
was committed heinously,122 or that a crime was a hate crime,123 or that a crime 
caused serious bodily injury?124  Some of the members of the Court did not 
believe that these proceedings are equivalent; they believed that a trial by jury 
and sentencing are two different things.125  But besides the view of these 
dissenting Justices, did the other Justices get it right? 
As a practical matter, Justice Scalia suggests in his concurring opinion in 
Ring that this rule must be promulgated, because if it does not, the danger for 
abuse is very high.126  Justice Scalia artfully points out that if we are to focus 
on form, rather than effect, then state legislatures could simply make an end-
run around the trial by jury requirement of the Sixth Amendment to the 
Constitution.127  By simply characterizing an enhancing guideline as a 
sentencing guideline, rather than as an element, the trial by jury would be 
usurped by allowing this fact to be found by the judge alone.128  Justice Scalia 
is not accusing the state legislatures of such an unconstitutional practice, but 
correctly recognizes the danger which is inherent in any finding of fact by the 
judge solely which could increase a defendant’s sentence.129 
As an initial matter, it seems much safer to have a jury decide these facts, 
simply to avoid any appearance of impropriety and to guarantee compliance 
with the Sixth Amendment.  Whereas it is true that practical considerations are 
important, the chief concern is whether the practice of the states, Arizona 
specifically, was in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution.  
Therefore, is Justice O’Connor correct in suggesting that this line of cases is 
 
 121. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating, in relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed”). 
 122. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2443. 
 123. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470. 
 124. Jones, 526 U.S. at 252. 
 125. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2449 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the rule derived in 
Apprendi and extended in Ring is not required by the Constitution, or history, or by our prior 
cases and in fact may cut against some of out prior case). 
 126. Id. at 2445 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 127. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 128. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 129. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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not required by the Sixth Amendment?  To decide this, the exact requirements 
of the Sixth Amendment must be determined. 
The requirement of a trial by jury is one of the oldest and most respected 
legal concepts.  The history of the right to a trial by jury dates back to the 
Magna Carta.130  Jury trials then transpired through English legal history.  Jury 
trials came to America and flourished because of the deep resentment of royal 
interference.  The right to a trial by jury was added as the Sixth Amendment to 
the Constitution, guaranteeing the right to trial by jury in criminal cases to all 
accused in Federal court.  All of the original states of the union included a right 
to trial by jury in their respective state constitutions and every state entering 
the Union has included the same protection. 
The right to a trial by jury could be something completely different than 
the right to sentencing by jury (as dealt with by the Ring case as the Ring case 
dealt with) and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudential history has been less than 
clear on this issue.  Initially, the Court had found that there was no Sixth 
Amendment right to be sentenced by a jury, even in a capital case.131  This 
holding was elaborated in McMillan, where the judge increased the sentence of 
a convicted defendant.132  The Supreme Court then limited the holding of 
McMillan in Apprendi.  The Court held in Apprendi that a judge may not 
increase the sentence of a convicted defendant to a term greater than what the 
jury could have sentenced the defendant.133  This limitation of McMillan 
allowed the Court to say that the fact-finding jury of the Sixth Amendment 
should do the fact-finding.134  There was an exception carved out of Apprendi 
for prior convictions as a sentencing factor, since this requires no fact-
finding.135  Because the sentencing factors in Ring would allow for a sentence 
of death, when the jury would only sentence life imprisonment, this statute 
seems squarely unconstitutional under Apprendi. 
After Apprendi, it seems only logical that the Arizona statute allows 
judicial fact-finding and must not be allowed.  The Ring decision itself is not 
that surprising as applied to the Arizona statute.  The reasoning offered in 
Apprendi to distinguish Walton was indeed “baffling”136 and it was only a 
 
 130. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-54 (1968) (providing a history of the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of a trial by jury). 
 131. Spaziono v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984) (“The fact that a capital sentencing is like 
a trial in some respects . . . does not mean that it is like a trial in respects significant to the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial.”). 
 132. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) (there is no Sixth Amendment right to 
jury sentencing). 
 133. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487, n. 13. 
 134. Id. at 497. 
 135. Id. at 488. 
 136. Id. at 538 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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matter of time before the Court considered the issue and ultimately found that 
Walton could not stand with Apprendi.  The logical extension of Apprendi to 
capital defendants makes perfect sense, since capital defendants should have 
more, not less, protection than non-capital defendants.  The truly interesting 
portion of this opinion is not what it does to the Arizona statute, but rather 
what happens to other statutes that may still involve some judicial fact-finding.  
Those statutes are more fully discussed below. 
C. Statutes Affected by the Ring Decision 
Thirty-eight states and the federal government allow for the death penal by 
as the ultimate form of punishment for the most heinous crimes.137  The form 
of sentencing procedures which allow for the imposition of the death penalty 
vary greatly from state to state.  With something this important, it is essential 
to ensure that the convicted defendant’s constitutional rights are absolutely 
protected. 
It has been shown that the Arizona statute is unconstitutional.  What about 
statutes that have the exact same scheme for sentencing as Ring?  What about 
states that have a system where the jury makes recommendations to the judge, 
but he is not bound by those recommendations?  What about states which 
allow a judge to sentence if the jury is unable to reach a decision?  What is the 
best sentencing system to ensure constitutional compliance? 
1. The Arizona Statute 
One thing is sure after the Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona; Arizona’s 
death penalty sentencing scheme, section 13-703, is now unconstitutional.138  
The Arizona legislature wasted no time in amending 13-703 to comport with 
Ring v. Arizona and the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution.  Even before the 
Ring decision was handed down by the Supreme Court, on February 11th, 
2002, the Forty-Fifth Legislature was hard at work in their second regular 
session of 2002.  The House of Representatives proposed legislation139 to 
completely strike section C and amend sections G and H to change all 
references from “the court” to “trier of fact.”  These subtle changes seem to 
make section 13-703 constitutional.  The passage of this bill was conditioned 
 
 137. See Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2447 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (saying that 
currently there are states that have moratoriums on the death penalty). 
 138. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (2001). 
 139. H.B. 2671, 45th Leg., 2d. Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2002). 
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by the House of Representatives in section 6 of the bill on the exact holding of 
Ring.140 
After the Ring v. Arizona decision was handed down by the Supreme Court 
on June 24, 2002, the Arizona Legislature amended its statute in order to meet 
the requirements of the Supreme Court.  The house bill, formerly introduced 
conditionally as H.B. 2671, was formally introduced to the House of 
Representatives141 and to the Senate142 simultaneously on July 30th, 2002.  No 
debate was had, and the bill was engrossed by both houses of the Legislature 
on August 1st of 2002 and passed by both houses of the Legislature on the 
same day.143 
The Arizona statute did exactly what the Supreme Court asked the 
Legislature to do, remove the judge from the fact-finding role after the 
conviction has been handed down.  The old scheme, discussed at length 
previously, required the judge to engage in fact-finding in order to determine 
the presence or absence of aggravating factors.144  This was done by the judge 
alone outside of the presence of the jury.  The revised statute removes this role 
from the province of the judge and places it squarely in the hands of the trier of 
fact.145  This is seemingly what the Ring decision requires146 and what now 
seems to make this statute constitutional.  This statute now comports with the 
Ring decision, but what about states that have the same or similar statutes?  
Those statutes will be discussed in the next section. 
2. States with Similar Statutes 
Four states other than Arizona had a very similar system by which the 
judge conducted the sentencing hearing by herself, outside of the presence of 
the jury.  The judge then makes factual findings regarding the aggravating 
and/or mitigating factors.  If the judge is able to outweigh the mitigating 
factors with aggravating factors, he alone then, may sentence the convicted 
defendant to death. 
 
 140. Id. at § 6 (“This act does not become effective unless the United States Supreme Court 
holds in Ring v. Arizona, United States Supreme Court case #01-488, that, in death penalty cases 
it is unconstitutional for a judge and not a jury to impose a sentence of death.”). 
 141. H.B. 2001, 45th Leg., 5th. Special Sess. (Ariz. 2002). 
 142. S.B. 1001, 45th Leg., 5th. Special Sess. (Ariz. 2002). 
 143. Id. (enacted version). 
 144. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (2001) (the judge is to conduct a second phase of the trial 
after the guilt phase to determine sentencing). 
 145. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (Supp. 2002) (now the judge may only find the facts of 
sentencing if the defendant agrees to waive her right to a trial by jury). 
 146. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2443 (holding that the judge alone may not make the finding of 
aggravating factors). 
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One such state, Colorado, has already amended its statute147 in accordance 
with the Ring decision.  Colorado’s previous statute148 allowed the sentencing 
procedures, including the fact-finding, to be conducted in front of a panel of 
three judges.  This was changed by Colorado’s Sixty-Third General Assembly 
on July 12th, 2002.149  The Colorado Legislature removed all references to the 
three-judge panel and replaced it with a trial judge sitting in front of the trial 
jury.  The procedure now mandates the trial judge to allow factual arguments 
to be made by the parties and then instruct the jury that they must find 
unanimously at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.150  The 
judge will be bound by this decision of the jury and if the jury is unable to 
reach a decision to all of the above specifications, the sentence automatically 
reverts to life imprisonment.151  In addition to the amendments by the 
legislature, the Colorado Supreme Court has also opined as to the 
constitutionality of their death penalty sentencing scheme152 and concluded 
that its system of capital sentencing is unconstitutional under Ring.153 Because 
of these recent developments, Colorado’s amended statutory scheme should 
now be constitutional. 
Montana also had a very similar statute154 which required that “the hearing 
must be conducted before the court alone.”155  However, even before the Ring 
decision was handed down, the Montana Legislature introduced and passed 
House Bill 521,156 which made subtle yet drastic changes to the Montana code.  
This bill codified section 46-1-401 of the Montana Code, which now requires 
that the jury find the enhancement actions in a separate proceeding 
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.157  This seems to make the 
Montana statute comport with Ring and remove Montana from the 
unconstitutional realm of death penalty sentencing by a judge alone. 
 
 147. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 (Supp. 2002). 
 148. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 (2001) (formerly COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 
(2001)). 
 149. H.B. 1005, 63rd Gen. Assem., 3d Extraord. Sess., (Colo. 2002). 
 150. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 (Supp. 2002) (the three judge panel will only engage in 
fact-finding during sentencing if the defendant knowingly waives his or her right to a trial by 
jury). 
 151. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(c) (Supp. 2002). 
 152. Woldt v. State, Nos. 97SA193, 97SA392, 2003 WL 459419, at *2 (Colo. 2003). 
 153. Press Release, Office of the Colorado State Attorney General, Attorney General Salazar 
to Seek U.S. Supreme Court Review of Colorado Court Rulings Striking Death Penalty Sentences 
(March 12, 2003) (stating that in the view of the Colorado Attorney General, the Ring decision 
needs to be clarified because of conflicting applications) (on file with author). 
 154. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2001). 
 155. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301(1) (2001). 
 156. H.B. 521, 57th Leg., Reg.. Sess., (Mont. 2001). 
 157. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-1-401 (Supp. 2002). 
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Nebraska was another state which allowed sentencing to be done by 
judges, including the factual finding of aggravating factors.  Nebraska’s 
statute158 required that a panel of three judges find the facts necessary for 
aggravation or mitigation and accordingly sentence the accused to life or death.  
This statute was amended following the Ring decision to remove the fact-
finding associated with aggravating and mitigating factors from the hands of 
the three judge panel and require that this be done by the jury alone.159  The 
only way that the panel of three judges may now hear the facts relating to the 
aggravating factors is if the defendant knowingly waives his right to have these 
facts heard by a jury.  The Governor of Nebraska called the State’s Legislature 
into a special session to decide on the constitutionality of the state statute in 
November.  The statute was amended by the Legislature and signed by the 
Governor on November 22nd, 2002.160  In addition to these amendments, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court recently decided that its statute was also 
unconstitutional under Ring.161  With these timely changes, Nebraska also 
seems to have a system that comports with the Ring decision.162 
Idaho is the final state which requires the trial judge make these factual 
findings and sentence a defendant without the benefit of a jury.  The Idaho 
statute163 is very similar to Colorado and Arizona’s statutes before they were 
amended.  This statute was not directly ruled unconstitutional by the Ring 
decision, since the only issue before the Court was the Arizona statute, but this 
statute seems to be squarely unconstitutional and will need to be amended.  
The Idaho Legislature has taken no action as of yet, but the Idaho Supreme 
Court has remanded death-row inmates who were sentenced under this scheme 
for re-sentencing in light of the Ring decision.164  The Idaho legislature is now 
in the process of amending its statute to comport with the Supreme Court’s 
 
 158. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (2001). 
 159. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (Supp. 2003). 
 160. NEB. LEGIS. 3SS 1 (2002). 
 161.  
 162. State v. Gales, No. S-01-1231, 2003 WL 1571588, at *18 (Neb. 2003) (stating that in 
light of the Ring  decision, the Nebraska statute, before amended, was unconstitutional). 
 163. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 2000). 
 164. State v. Fetterly, 52 P.2d 874, 875 (Idaho 2002) (stating: 
[s]ubsequent to the decision in the district court and the appeal to this Court the United 
States Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona which appears to invalidate the death 
penalty scheme in Idaho which to this time has allowed the sentencing judge to make 
factual findings of the aggravating factors necessary to the imposition of a death sentence. 
Ring requires those factual findings to be made by a jury. In light of that decision it is 
necessary to remand this case for further consideration by the district court.). 
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ruling in Ring, but the Idaho code has yet to be revised to reflect those 
changes.165 
3. Hybrid Statutes 
The first of the statutes which were not directly addressed by the Court’s 
opinion in Ring, but are definitely indirectly implicated are the so-called 
“hybrid” statutes.166  Whereas these statutes differ slightly from state-to-state, 
they share the common thread that both the judge and the jury are involved in 
fact-finding to determine whether or not to sentence a convicted defendant to 
death. 
The first of these statutes is found in the Alabama code.167  This code 
provision mandates that the judge initially is to instruct the trial jury as to 
aggravating and mitigating factors.168  The jury then deliberates and attempts 
to determine if one of the statutory aggravating factors exists in the minds of at 
least ten of the twelve jurors and that it outweighs any mitigating factors.169  
The jury then issues a sentence recommendation to the judge presiding over 
sentencing.170  The trial judge then enters another phase of sentencing in which 
he may hear further arguments from the parties and then makes written 
findings of fact about aggravating and mitigating circumstances.171  The judge 
then sentences the convicted defendant by himself.  The judge may take the 
jury’s findings into account, but he is in no way bound by that 
recommendation.172  The Alabama system has been tested by court cases, but 
at this point, the courts have been able to distinguish Ring because of the facts 
of those particular cases.173 
Three other states had similar statutes at the time of the Ring opinion: 
Delaware,174 Florida,175 and Indiana.176  These statutes are all very similar in 
 
 165. See Gregory Hahn, Death Penalty Bill Clears House, Kempthorne has Already Promised 
to Sign the Measure, THE IDAHO STATESMAN, Feb. 5, 2003, at 04, available at 2003 WL 
4775490. 
 166. Hybrid statutes were employed by Alabama, Delaware, Florida and Indiana. 
 167. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-45 – 13A-5-47 (1999). 
 168. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(a) (1999). 
 169. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e) (1999). 
 170. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(a) (1999). 
 171. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-47(b) – 13A-5-47(e) (1999). 
 172. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1999). 
 173. See e.g., Ex Parte Waldrop, No. 1001194, 2002 WL 31630710 (Ala. Nov. 22, 2002) at 
*5 (Ring not implicated where the aggravating factor of “committed during the commission of a 
robbery” is part of the offense which was proven beyond a reasonable doubt through the jury’s 
verdict of guilt). 
 174. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209 (2001). 
 175. FLA. STAT. ch. § 921.141 (2001). 
 176. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (1998). 
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the crucial fact that all of these statutes involve a jury making an advisory 
verdict to a judge who is not bound by that determination, who then solely 
issues a verdict. 
In anticipation of possible constitutional challenge to their state statutes, 
some of the states which used this sentencing system have already taken steps 
after Ring to ensure that their sentencing schemes comport with the Supreme 
Court’s decision.177  Delaware has already amended its death penalty 
sentencing statute178 in order to make the jury’s recommendation a report and 
require that the jury alone make the factual findings.179  Indiana has amended 
its statute180 to say that if the jury has made a determination, then the judge 
must sentence the convicted defendant accordingly, leaving no room for 
judicial interpretation of the jury’s recommendation.181 Alabama182 and 
Florida183 also use a system of advisory verdicts which have yet to be revised 
after Ring.  These states have had a few challenges to their statutes that have 
distinguished Ring on the grounds that the jury is still doing the actual fact-
finding.184  This of course does not mean that a court of these states could not 
preempt the legislature and rule the statute unconstitutional based on Ring, if 
the facts of a particular case are identical to Ring.185 
The reason that these statutes are under constitutional scrutiny after the 
Ring decision is not based on the direct holding of Ring,186 but rather the 
proposition that Ring suggests any judicial fact-finding in relation to an 
increase in sentencing is unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment.  These 
statutes do require fact-finding by the jury, but the possible constitutional 
defect is that judges are not required to follow these recommendations and may 
engage in their own fact-finding resulting in a sentence of death despite the 
jury’s inability to sentence the defendant to death.  The main issue is whether a 
non-binding recommendation of the jury is enough to remove these statutes 
 
 177. Press Release, Office of the Del. Atty. Gen’l, New Death Penalty Bills Signed Into Law 
(July 23, 2002) (on file with author). 
 178. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209 (Supp. 2002). 
 179. 2002 DEL. LAWS 423 (2002) (mandating that the judge adopt the jury’s 
recommendation). 
 180. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 2002). 
 181. 2002 IND. LEGIS. SERV. 117 (Supp. 2002). 
 182. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-45 – 13A-5-47 (1999). 
 183. FLA. STAT. ch. § 921.141 (2001). 
 184. These cases will be discussed at length herein. 
 185. Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla. 2002), cert. denied 123 S.Ct. 662 (U.S. 
Dec. 6, 2002) (the Florida Supreme Court has already addressed this issue, holding for now that 
their statute is constitutional, but three members of the court are not convinced). 
 186. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2443 (the direct holding is that the judge alone may not make the 
factual determinations which can increase a convicted defendant’s sentence to a level greater than 
the sentence that a jury could give to the defendant). 
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from constitutional scrutiny.  This recommendation is the only thing that 
separates these hybrid statutes from the statute held unconstitutional in Ring.  
This non-binding nuance will likely be insufficient to save these statutes from 
the constitutional scrutiny.  It was a wise choice for the legislatures of 
Delaware, Florida, Indiana and Alabama to revise their statutes with an eye not 
towards the letter of Ring, but rather the spirit of Ring. 
4. States Which Still Allow Some Judicial Fact-Finding 
There is yet another category of state statutes which have sentencing 
schemes implicated by the Ring decision.  These statutes advise that the jury 
should make the factual determinations, but have a provision which may still 
allow for some judicial fact-finding of the type prohibited by Ring.  These 
statutes do not seem facially unconstitutional after the Ring decision, but may 
still have fatal errors. 
Missouri187 and Nevada188 each employ a system by which the jury hears 
testimony from both of the parties as to statutory aggravating and mitigating 
factors.189  The jury is then instructed as to the requisite burden of proof and 
procedures and they then retire for deliberation.  The jury reports its verdict to 
the judge who is to sentence the defendant accordingly.190  Up to this point, 
these statutes seem squarely constitutional and indeed ideal.191  The possibly 
fatal flaw now comes into play.  If the jury decides that aggravating factors 
exist and those aggravating factors outweigh any mitigating factors, they then 
proceed to decide whether or not the defendant should be sentenced to life or 
death.192  If the jury cannot come to a decision as to whether the defendant 
should receive life imprisonment or the death penalty (as both require 
unanimous decisions), this determination then returns to the judge193 or to a 
three judge panel194 for determination. 
At first this would seem to violate the rule proffered in Ring, but further 
discussion is needed.  Under this system, the jury truly decides unanimously 
and beyond a reasonable doubt whether or not aggravating factors exist, and 
only after the jury decides that these aggravating factors exist does the jury 
even move to the question of life or death.  If the jury does not find 
aggravating factors, a verdict of life imprisonment must be returned.  Since the 
 
 187. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2000). 
 188. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 175.552 – 175.556 (2001). 
 189. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2000). 
 190. See, e.g., id. 
 191. Ideal statutes will be discussed more fully herein. 
 192. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2000). 
 193. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2000). 
 194. NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.556 (2001). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] I’M SORRY YOUR HONOR, YOU WILL NOT DECIDE MY FATE TODAY 547 
 
jury is truly making the initial factual determination, does this system violate 
Ring? 
A strong argument, based mainly on the spirit of the majority holding in 
Ring, can be made that this system does not violate Ring.  The statute in 
Arizona,195 which was specifically held unconstitutional, is markedly different 
from this variety of state statutes.  The Arizona statute had no jury involvement 
and left the determination of the sentence solely to the judge.196  In Missouri 
and Nevada, the question of the judicial sentencing of the convicted defendant 
can never be reached unless the jury first unanimously finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the statutory aggravating factors exist beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
There are two main differences between these statutes and the ideal state 
statutes.  First is the automatic reversion to life imprisonment or a term of 
years if the jury is unable to decide on sentencing.  Second is the exact 
detailing of which aggravating and mitigating factors were found by the jury.  
The two-tier schemes employed by Missouri and Nevada seem to offer similar 
constitutional protection to other state statutes with the only difference being 
that if the jury is unable to decide on the sentence after it has decided that the 
aggravating factors exist, the decision will then return to the judge for the 
ultimate determination. 
Courts interpreting the Missouri statute have largely sidestepped the issue 
of constitutionality of the Missouri sentencing scheme and pattern jury 
instructions in sentencing a defendant under Ring,197 theory being that in order 
to get to the life and death determination in Missouri courts, one must assume 
that the jury has reached a unanimous decision to at least one aggravating 
factor.  This assumption has operated for a long time and is a sound legal 
inference.  There are two main problems with this theory after Ring.  First, the 
jury is not required to enumerate which aggravating factors it found in 
deliberations.  The problem with non-enumeration is that the judge, in 
considering which sentence to choose in the case of a deadlock, knows not 
what the jury was considering in its deliberations.  This then forces the judge to 
 
 195. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (2001). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Smith v. Bowersox, 311 F.3d 915, 918 n.2 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating 
Missouri’s pattern jury instructions, which were given at Smith’s trial, direct the jury to 
return a sentence of life imprisonment if it cannot unanimously agree on at least one 
aggravating factor. In the past, where the jury did not impose a sentence of life 
imprisonment, we have presumed that the jury did find at least one such aggravating 
factor.  However, we note that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ring v. Arizona, 
now requires the jury to find an aggravating factor before the judge may impose a 
sentence of death. We express no opinion as to whether Missouri’s pattern instructions 
and procedures are constitutional under Ring. (internal citations omitted)). 
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go through a second fact-finding in sentencing the defendant, which may run 
this system afoul of Ring.  The second problem is the issue of weighing all of 
the aggravating factors against mitigating factors.  If the jury deadlocks, the 
judge then has to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors.  This raises the 
question of whether this weighing of factors is fact-finding in itself.  Many 
courts have taken the position that this process is a mere weighing of interests 
and not fact-finding.198  However, some courts have seen this as fact-finding in 
itself.199  If this process is indeed determined to be fact-finding, this system 
could also be unconstitutional under the Ring decision. 
The Nevada Supreme Court has recently addressed the issue of the 
applicability of Ring to the Nevada statute.  It found that both the initial 
determination by the three-judge panel after a deadlock by the jury that 
aggravating and mitigating factors exist as well as the weighing of the 
aggravating and mitigating factors against each other are both inherently fact-
finding endeavors and therefore must be done by the jury alone after Ring.200  
This decision renders the Nevada statute unconstitutional under Ring.  This 
court’s interpretation of Ring is interesting in that two of the aggravating 
circumstances did not truly entail fact-finding because those factors were that 
(1) the murders were committed while engaged in a robbery, where the 
defendant was also convicted of robbery; and (2) that the defendant committed 
more than one murder when he was indeed convicted of four murders by the 
jury.  It is interesting that these aggravating factors that some courts have 
found not to entail fact-finding201 have here been determined to be fact-finding.  
Whereas the Nevada Supreme Court believes this to be an unconstitutional 
practice, a strong argument can be made that this practice may indeed be 
constitutional, albeit unconventional and imperfect.202 
The key difference between the judicial involvement between Arizona-
type and Missouri-type statutes is that in Missouri, the judge is not the sole 
official making factual determinations as to whether the aggravating factors 
indeed exist.  The only judicial involvement is that the judge may, if the jury 
 
 198. Ex Parte Waldrup, 2002 WL 31630710 at *6 (“the weighing process is not a factual 
determination . . . in fact, the relative weight of aggravating circumstances and mitigating 
circumstances is not susceptible to any quantum of proof”). 
 199. Johnson v. Nevada, 59 P.3d 450, 460 (Nev. 2002). 
 200. Id. 
 201. See e.g., Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 705 (Anstead, C.J., concurring). 
 202. Another issue still to be determined (outside of the scope of this paper) is whether or not 
the Supreme Court will expand its list of sentencing enhancement guidelines that can 
constitutionally be found by the judge alone.  Currently, only prior convictions can be found on 
this way because this requires no fact-finding.  However, other factors such as multiple killings or 
commission of another felony, if the defendant is also convicted of those crimes may be 
permissibly found in the future, but this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] I’M SORRY YOUR HONOR, YOU WILL NOT DECIDE MY FATE TODAY 549 
 
deadlocks, decide on the basis of the facts which sentence the convicted 
defendant should receive.203  Arizona used a system where the judge was the 
sole fact finder, completely leaving the jury out of the picture.  These 
differences are more than simple semantics and are true substantive differences 
that should make the difference between passing constitutional muster and 
being ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.  While it would still be 
advisable to amend these statutes to comport with the ideal statutes, it does not 
seem that these statutes should be ruled unconstitutional based on the direct 
holding or rationale of Ring. 
5. Optimal Statutes 
Despite all of the apparent problems with the above-mentioned statutes, an 
overwhelming majority of the jurisdictions that impose the death penalty do 
indeed conduct their sentencing in exactly the manner in which the Supreme 
Court suggests that they should.  The advantage of these state statutes is the 
number of safeguards which are in place to ensure that aggravating factors, if 
they are to be found, are found in a constitutional manner.  These safeguards 
include (1) having the jury alone make these factual determinations; (2) 
making sure that the findings are made unanimously and beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and finally (3) if the jury is unable to do each of these things, the 
sentence will automatically revert to a lesser term of prison time.  The judge 
has no fact-finding role in the entire process. 
The states which followed this regiment before the Ring decision included: 
Arkansas,204 California,205 Connecticut,206 Georgia,207 Illinois,208 Kansas,209 
Kentucky,210 Louisiana,211 Maryland,212 Mississippi,213 New Hampshire,214 
New Jersey,215 New Mexico,216 New York,217 North Carolina,218 Ohio,219 
 
 203. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2000). 
 204. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603 (1987). 
 205. CAL. CODE §§ 190.3 – 190.4 (1999). 
 206. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (2001). 
 207. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-30 – 17-10-30.1 (2000). 
 208. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/9-1 (Supp. 2002). 
 209. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624 (2000). 
 210. KY. REV. STAT. § 532.025 (2001). 
 211. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905 – 905.8 (1997). 
 212. MD. CODE ANN. CRIMINAL LAW § 2-303 (2002). 
 213. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (1999). 
 214. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (1996). 
 215. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West Supp. 2002). 
 216. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-20A-1 – 31-20A-3 (Michie 2000). 
 217. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (Supp. 2002). 
 218. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (Supp. 2002). 
 219. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (West 2002). 
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Oklahoma,220 Oregon,221 Pennsylvania,222 South Carolina,223 South Dakota,224 
Tennessee,225 Texas,226 Utah,227 Virginia,228 Washington,229 and Wyoming,230 
as well as the general federal death penalty statute231 and a specialized federal 
procedure for cases involving drugs.232  Although the statutes vary slightly, 
they all include these basic safeguards mentioned above.  Because of the 
safeguards that are present in these state statutes, there seems to be little 
question that these statutes are constitutional after Ring. 
D. Retroactivity: The Future of Current Cases 
Whenever the Supreme Court issues a landmark opinion of criminal 
procedure such as this, one of the main questions left open by the opinion itself 
is the applicability of the basis and rationale of the opinion to those already 
incarcerated.  There are a few well-settled principles which should be 
addressed initially. 
First, it is a well settled matter that this case may now be used as precedent 
for all cases which are yet to happen.233  Second, it is also well settled that if a 
case has been adjudicated at the trial level, that this case may be used on direct 
appeal in an attempt to invalidate the statute upon which they were 
sentenced.234  Third, as a matter of policy, all of the states that allow for capital 
punishment have clemency procedures through the executive branch of the 
controlling authority.235  The questions left open involve post-conviction relief 
and collateral attacks.  These are often handled through federal habeas corpus 
motions236 and similar state proceedings.237  Thus the question must be 
answered as to the applicability of this decision to persons who have already 
 
 220. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 §§ 701.10 - 701.11 (1999). 
 221. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (1999). 
 222. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (Supp. 2002). 
 223. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 2001). 
 224. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-27A-2 - 23A-27A-5 (Michie 2001). 
 225. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (Supp. 2000). 
 226. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37-071 (Vernon Supp. 2003). 
 227. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76.3-207 (2002). 
 228. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 2002). 
 229. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.95.030 – 10.95.080 (2001). 
 230. WYO. STAT ANN. § 6-2-102 (Michie 2001). 
 231. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591 – 3593 (2000). 
 232. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2000). 
 233. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2442 (“stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law”). 
 234. See Standard Industries, Inc. v. Tigrett Industries, Inc., 397 U.S. 586, 587 (1970). 
 235. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (“[t]he governor shall have power to grant reprieves, 
commutations and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses except treason”). 
 236. 28 U.S.C. §§2254-2255 (2000). 
 237. See, e.g., Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15 (West 2000). 
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exhausted all of their appeals, but still wish to escape a death sentence which 
may have been unconstitutionally imposed. 
This area of jurisprudence is also fairly well settled.  Generally, rules that 
are promulgated after direct appeal and in time for a post-conviction relief 
motion cannot be used to upset a verdict on collateral attack or post-conviction 
relief.238  There are, however, two narrow exceptions to this general rule.239 
First, there is an exception for rulings that place “certain kinds of primary, 
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making 
authority.”240  Put more simply, a movant in a collateral attack case may be 
granted a new hearing if a certain conduct is decriminalized.241  This exception 
is obviously not applicable to Ring, because felony murder has not been 
decriminalized. 
The second exception under Teague is for cases that are “central to an 
accurate determination of innocence or guilt.”242  Again, more simply, this 
exception provides for retroactive application of “watershed rule[s] of criminal 
procedure.”243  It may at first seem that the rule in Ring would be a watershed 
rule of criminal procedure, but it must be realized how narrow this watershed 
exception truly is.  In fact, only one reported case has held its promulgated rule 
of criminal procedure so central to be considered “watershed.”244  In realizing 
how narrow this exception is and comparing this rule to the other rules 
examined, it can be seen that this rule is not so central to be considered 
watershed. 
Of the courts that have addressed this issue, many of them have failed to 
reach the issue, but the ones that have squarely addressed the retroactivity of 
Ring expressed that “[petitioner] is simply incorrect in asserting that the 
combination of Teague, Ring and the cases in the Apprendi line render the rule 
announced in Ring retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”245  
For the above-stated reasons, the rule adopted in Ring cannot be considered a 
watershed rule.  Because neither of the Teague exceptions applies; the Ring 
decision simply cannot be applied retroactively to collateral attack cases. 
 
 238. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306-07 (1989). 
 239. Id. at 307. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 477 (1993). 
 242. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307. 
 243. Id. at 311. 
 244. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). 
 245. Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 992-93 (10th Cir. 2002); see also Sibley v. Culliver, 
No. CIV.A.02-A-1217-N, 2003 WL 256907, at *11 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 3, 2003); State v. Towery, 
Nos. CR-02-0031-PC, CR-02-0022-PC, CR-02-0038-PC, CR-02-0146-PC, 2003 WL 548386 at 
*6 (Ariz. Feb. 26, 2003). 
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E. Subsequent Cases246 
Despite the relative short amount of time that the Ring decision has been 
law, the number of court challenges based on this landmark case has been 
remarkable.  Many cases have discussed this case and that number continues to 
grow daily, but the number of cases to directly address the content of this case 
note is still relatively small.  There are cases which distinguish the challenged 
statutes from the Arizona statute invalidated in Ring, and cases which follow 
lock-step behind the Supreme Court and invalidate state statutes based on 
Ring.  Those two types of cases will be discussed below. 
1. Distinguishing Cases 
The number of cases which have distinguished the Ring opinion is 
relatively small.  This is most likely a result of the fact that courts are hesitant 
to not follow the reasoning of the highest court in the land, even if the statute is 
clearly distinguishable.  In addition to this, statutes which are clearly not 
implicated are likely not to be challenged and therefore no cases reported. 
Of the cases which distinguish the Ring opinion, one of the most 
interesting247 is the Florida Supreme Court case of Bottoson v. Moore.248  In 
this post-conviction relief case, Petitioner Linroy Bottoson attempted to have 
the Florida death penalty statute249 invalidated on the basis of the Court’s 
decision in Ring.  The Florida Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, denied 
his post-conviction relief on the basis that (1) Petitioner’s execution was stayed 
by the Supreme Court prior to the Ring decision and the Court released the stay 
after the decision was released without discussing the implication of Ring on 
the Florida statute; and (2) the Supreme Court specifically did not overturn any 
precedent in Ring upon which the Florida statute relied for its constitutional 
basis.250  With these considerations, The Florida court determined that 
Bottoson was not entitled to relief.251 
Other than the Bottoson case, the Indiana Supreme Court refused to 
squarely address the applicability of Ring to the Indiana death penalty 
statute.252  In Wrinkles v. State, the court found that there was no reason to 
address the issues because of the complete implausibility of the Petitioner’s 
 
 246. Subsequent cases published to Westlaw as of Apr. 1, 2003. 
 247. Interesting not for the differentiation of the statute, but because of the opinions of the 
concurring Justices suggesting why Florida’s statute should be unconstitutional in light of the 
Ring decision. 
 248. Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 695. 
 249. FLA. STAT. ch. § 921.141 (2001). 
 250. Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 695. 
 251. Id. (three Justices do discuss serious problems, in their opinions, with the Florida statute 
in light of Ring, those concurrences will be discussed at length herein). 
 252. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 2002). 
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arguments.253  The aggravating factor that was used to sentence the Petitioner 
in this case was the fact that multiple murders had been committed and the 
court found that the jury did establish this fact when it returned its verdict in 
the guilt phase because it found him guilty of three counts of murder.254  Since 
the jury found these facts unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
Ring issue is not properly addressed.255  A similar issue was raised in Alabama 
in Ex Parte Waldrup; the aggravating factor was the fact that the defendant 
killed the victims in the course of a robbery.256  Since the defendant was found 
guilty of homicide committed in the commission of a robbery, the court 
determined that the jury did indeed make the factual determinations necessary 
for the aggravating factor.257 
Other than these major cases, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma 
refused to extend Ring to the Oklahoma death penalty statute258 without giving 
much guidance.259  However, in concurrence, Justice Johnson more fully 
explained that Ring is inapplicable to the Oklahoma statute because the 
requisite aggravating factors are all determined by the jury in accordance with 
Ring.260 
There have also been two federal cases to address the constitutionality of 
the federal death penalty statute261 and the fact that it does not require the 
government to indict the aggravating factors as part of the substantive charge.  
In effect, this would change the offense charged to the initial offense plus the 
aggravating factors so that all of the facts necessary will be found by the jury 
as if they were all elements of the crime.262  The court rejected this argument 
and suggested that the aggravating factors were required to be found by the 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but that there was no requirement that the 
offense itself should be changed to incorporate the aggravating factors.263 
2. Cases which Follow Ring 
All across the country, direct appeals and post-conviction relief cases are 
being filed on the basis of the Ring decision.  Many courts that have considered 
 
 253. Wrinkles v. State, 776 N.E.2d 905, 907-08 (Ind. 2002). 
 254. Id. at 908. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Ex Parte Waldrup, 2002 WL 31630710 at *5. 
 257. Id. 
 258. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 §§ 701.10 - 701.11 (1999). 
 259. Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 566 (Okla. 2002). 
 260. Id. at 578. 
 261. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591 – 3593 (2000). 
 262. United States v. Reagan, 221 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677-78 (E.D.Va. 2002); United States v. 
Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d 672, 679 (E.D.Va. 2002). 
 263. Reagan, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 679; Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 680. 
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this issue have suggested that the sentencing schemes in their respective 
jurisdictions do indeed follow Ring or are unconstitutional under Ring.  On 
June 28th, 2002, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded four Arizona cases 
for reconsideration in light of the Ring decision.264 
After Ring, a number of jurisdictions are reviewing their death penalty 
statutes.  One such jurisdiction is the federal government, where the Federal 
Death Penalty Act was recently held unconstitutional.265  Judge Sessions 
reviewed the Federal Death Penalty Act and found that because the 
aggravating factors are to be treated like elements after Ring, the relaxed 
evidentiary standard available at sentencing is unacceptable because it allows 
for the evidence introduced at sentencing to be treated differently than the 
evidence at trial, and therefore must be unconstitutional.266 
In addition to this federal court, the Supreme Court of Idaho has also 
suggested that the decision of the Supreme Court in Ring “appears to invalidate 
the death penalty scheme in Idaho.”267 Arizona has also realized after Ring that 
its death penalty statute is unconstitutional and has ordered that all of the 
defendants sentenced under the old scheme be re-sentenced or have their 
sentences reduced to life with or without parole.268 
Finally, the Nevada Supreme Court has recently held its death penalty 
sentencing scheme unconstitutional.  In a case where the jury was unable to 
reach a verdict as to a life sentence or the death penalty after determining the 
existence of aggravating factors and this determination was then turned over to 
a panel of three judges,269 those judges imposed the death penalty.  The 
Supreme Court of Nevada then reversed that verdict as being contrary to the 
holding in Ring.270  The court determined that because both the initial 
determination of aggravating and mitigating factors as well as the weighing of 
those factors against each other required some factual determination, this 
statute was unconstitutional after Ring.271  This ruling is unique because the 
Nevada statute was the closest statute to ideal to be struck down to date, and 
may show the true far-reaching impact of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ring. 
 
 264. Allen v. United States, 122 S.Ct. 2653 (2002) (mem.); Harrod v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2653 
(2002) (mem.); Pandeli v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2654 (2002) (mem.); Sansing v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 
2654 (2002) (mem.). 
 265. United States v. Fell, 217 F.Supp.2d 469, 483 (D.Vt. 2002). 
 266. Id. 
 267. State v. Fetterly, 52 P.3d 874, 875 (Idaho 2002). 
 268. See e.g., State v. Smith, 50 P.3d 825, 831 (Ariz. 2002). 
 269. Johnson, 59 P.3d 450 at 458-59. 
 270. Id. at 454.  The aggravating factors were that the killings were committed in the 
commission of a robbery, to which the defendant was also sentenced and that the there were more 
than two killings in one incident, where the defendant was convicted of four murders. 
 271. Id. at 459. 
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Besides the jurisdictions to rule their death penalty sentencing schemes 
unconstitutional, one of the most interesting debates about the application of 
Ring to a state statute is occurring in Florida.  The Bottoson case272 sidestepped 
the issue of the applicability to Ring to the hybrid sentencing structure of 
Florida, but the concurring justices in Bottoson signaled that this was not the 
last to be heard from that court on this issue.273  Three of the justices suggested 
that the Florida statute was indeed unconstitutional under Ring and were 
mystified as to why the majority did not address this issue.274 
Chief Justice Anstead suggested that the Florida statute has serious 
problems because (1) the nature of the advisory opinion system violates Ring; 
and (2) that advisory opinion is not even required to be unanimous, again 
violating Ring.275  Chief Justice Anstead nonetheless concluded that since the 
Ring opinion did not overrule Florida’s statute or the Supreme Court precedent 
for it, that the result reached by the majority was indeed correct.276 
Justice Shaw argued that the Florida statute violates Ring because the 
aggravating factors are the functional equivalent of elements which should be 
proven unanimously and Florida does not require such a unanimous finding.277  
Justice Shaw also concluded that this Petitioner was not entitled to relief, 
because one of the aggravating factors found was prior convictions, the one 
aggravating factor which can still be found by a judge after Ring.278 
Justice Pariente believed that the Florida statute was functionally similar to 
Ring and should be found unconstitutional,279 but believed that because of the 
Supreme Court precedent, that this was an issue for the Supreme Court to 
address and thus concurred in the result.280  Despite the fact that the 
 
 272. Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 704 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 273. Id. at 725 (Pariente, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 274. Id (Pariente, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 275. Id. at 705 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 276. Id. at 704 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 277. Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 716 (Shaw, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 278. Id. at 718-19 (Shaw, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 279. Id. at 725 (Pariente, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating: 
In effect, the maximum penalty of death can be imposed only with the additional factual 
finding that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors. In effect, Florida juries in 
capital cases do not do what Ring mandates—that is, make specific findings of fact 
regarding the aggravators necessary for imposition of the death penalty. In effect, Florida 
juries advise the judge on the sentence and the judge finds the specific aggravators that 
support the sentence imposed. Indeed, under both the Florida and Arizona schemes, it is 
the judge who independently finds the aggravators necessary to impose the death 
sentence. Whether the non-unanimous advisory role of Florida’s penalty phase juries is of 
sufficient constitutional significance under the Sixth Amendment to distinguish Florida’s 
sentencing statute from the Arizona statute invalidated in Ring is a question for the United 
States Supreme Court to decide.). 
 280. Id.  (Pariente, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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circumstances of this particular case were not correct for the ruling of the 
Florida statute unconstitutional under Ring, it seems to forecast that the day 
Florida overrules this statute is not too far away after the Florida Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Bottoson.  The Florida court has subsequently held up the 
Bottoson case in other post-conviction relief as well as direct appeal cases in 
Florida.281  This fate could reach many other state statutes as this decision has 
more of an opportunity to work its way through the courts. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Because of the considerations mentioned above, the case of Ring v. 
Arizona was indeed correctly decided.  It must be understood that Ring was not 
a watershed decision; it was merely the logical extension of Apprendi to the 
death penalty.  Prior to this decision, it was odd to see the Supreme Court 
attempt to distinguish its prior precedent while creating an unintelligible rule.  
As previously mentioned, stare decisis is important to U.S. legal history.  It is 
important not only to preserve the finality of decisions made and rules 
promulgated, but also to provide some measure of predictability to our legal 
system.  This latter goal is what allows our common law system to survive and 
is truly a cornerstone of American jurisprudence. 
While these considerations are no doubt important, what measure of 
predictability is furthered by a rule of conflicting cases that even the Supreme 
Court has a difficult time interpreting and applying to fact situations?  In this 
situation, the Supreme Court and the American public are better off creating a 
new rule, one which not only provides a certain amount of guidance to the 
public, but also to legislatures so that they can create statutes which will 
comport with the Constitution.  When we have a rule that allows a judge to 
increase a sentence from life to death, but disallow as unconstitutional a 
sentencing scheme which adds two years to the jury sentence, how can this 
comport with the constitutional and practical concerns of fairness to the 
convicted defendant?  Why should a capital defendant actually enjoy less 
protection under the Constitution than an ordinary criminal defendant? 
These were the questions that needed to be answered in the Ring case, but 
were these questions answered?  Did the Ring Court answer these questions 
and create a more user-friendly rule?  The Court attempted to standardize the 
system and create a rule which would allow for predictability.  What the Court 
failed to do was provide much guidance as to a threshold for what will amount 
to constitutional sentencing and what will violate the Sixth Amendment.  The 
rule promulgated is that any fact which, if found, could lead to the sentencing 
of a defendant to a term greater than she could have been sentenced following 
an adverse verdict from a jury, must not be found by the judge alone.  While 
 
 281. See e.g., Anderson v. State, No. SC95773, 2003 WL 124468 at *16 (Fla., Jan. 16, 2003). 
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this is not the clearest rule of criminal procedure, it is certainly a clearer rule 
than what existed before Ring.  The old rule was similar but had to be qualified 
by the Court’s jurisprudence, which made it much more complicated.  The 
rule, as it now exists, does provide some minimal guidance to legislatures, as 
well as some measure of predictability to potential defendants and fair and 
even application under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. 
But there are still questions remaining under this rule.  Statutes, like 
Arizona’s, that leave the process of fact-finding solely to the judge are 
unconstitutional.  Statutes which leave fact-finding entirely to the jury seem to 
be constitutional so long as the facts are found unanimously and beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The issue that still remains relates to hybrid systems.  
Hopefully, this case note has addressed some of those questions.  By looking at 
the letter and the spirit of the Ring holding as well as subsequent case law; it 
can be seen that it is the effect and not the form of the system which should 
determine its constitutionality.  Some judicial fact-finding may still be 
acceptable under Ring, but states must be careful in allowing any significant 
judicial fact-finding after Ring. 
The issue of what requires fact-finding and what does not may also arise.  
Some aggravating factors clearly do not require fact-finding, such as prior 
convictions.  Other aggravating factors also seemingly do not require any fact-
finding.  Aggravating factors such as multiple killings or multiple crimes, if the 
defendant is convicted of all of the elements of the aggravating factor do not 
seem to require fact-finding, but it remains to be seen if the Court will expand 
its list of aggravating factors which may be constitutionally found by a judge 
alone. 
In addition to the roles issue and defining what requires fact-finding, the 
issue of retroactivity must be answered.  This case may indeed increase the 
number of petitions for post-conviction relief, but this begs the question to 
Justice O’Connor that if the defendants were sentenced in an unconstitutional 
manner in the first place, shouldn’t we want them to challenge their sentences; 
isn’t that why we have post-conviction relief?  Also, if it is judicially 
determined that this rule is not retroactive, none of these post-conviction cases 
will prevail and eventually will tail off and cease to be a drain on the resources 
of the judicial system, a small price to pay. 
The remaining questions are much more of clarity than of substance.  The 
exact holding of the Court needs to be clarified to determine if what was meant 
is that judges alone must not serve as fact finders or if what was meant is that 
juries alone must find these facts.  This leaves open for attack those systems 
which use both the judge and the jury or the judge alone after a deadlock by a 
jury to determine the facts for aggravation and mitigation.  Some of these 
systems may indeed be constitutional, but it would be wise for legislatures to 
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take note of the Court’s position and carefully review their statutes in light of 
Ring. 
The intent of this case note was to answer some of the remaining questions 
left open under Ring and hopefully it has accomplished this goal by identifying 
those states which may have problem statutes and making a judgment as to 
whether or not those statutes may still constitutionally stand after Ring.  One 
thing is sure, we have finally received clear guidance from the Supreme Court 
about how to reconcile Walton with Apprendi and Jones; we cannot. 
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